The continuation of the Russo-Japanese war and the French steps towards Morocco have offered a different approach for Berlin politicians. Recent research has shown that Berlin is trying to disrupt the new Agreement while distorting Russia. Both attempts failed, the first more spectacular and more dangerous than the second.  There was similar pressure in London because Grey had to show the cabinet radicals that Anglo-German relations could still be improved. After many preliminary manoeuvres, the cabinet agreed to send Lord Haldane, former Minister of War and now Chancellor of the Lord, to Berlin. Haldane, who was fluent in German, was a well-known figure in the German leadership. Haldane met Emperor Wilhelm, Bethmann Hollweg and Tirpitz. They gave him a copy of the new maritime law. Even more critically, they proposed slowing down the construction programme if Britain promised benevolent neutrality in a European war. Haldane responded by promising not to participate in an un provoked attack on Germany, an agreement that Berlin would not accept. When Haldane returned to London, Churchill and naval personnel concluded that the new law posed an even greater threat to British security than they had anticipated.
In the end, it was simple: a 33 percent increase in German ships in active service. Britain could only cope with this new threat by repositioning ships, particularly from the Mediterranean. Clearly, the talks had failed and shipbuilding in Britain and Germany continued quickly.  Britain, which traditionally had control of the seas, considered the German navy in 1909 to be a serious threat to its Royal Navy. Britain was leading in terms of dreadnought technology and responded with a large construction program. They built a Royal Navy with which Germany could never compete. In February 1912, the British sent the Minister of War, Lord Haldane, to Berlin to reduce friction resulting from the Anglo-German maritime arms race. The mission failed because the Germans tried to combine a “naval leave” with the British promise to remain neutral if Germany engaged in a war where “Germany could not be called an aggressor.” Zara Steiner says: “This would have meant abandoning the whole Agreement system, which has been so carefully maintained over the past six years. There was no German concession to counter the fear of German aggression.  For the most part, the British reserved the right to join any country that attacked Germany, even though Germany did not start a war that condemned the talks to failure.
  According to the German historian Dirk Bunker, “the [marine] race was decided very early; Politicians and diplomats learned to stick it as a subject, and it did not provoke the choice of war in 1914. Nevertheless, maritime competition has created an atmosphere of mutual hostility and mistrust that has limited the place to peaceful diplomacy and public recognition of common interests and has helped pave the twisted path to war in Europe.  The second German initiative to withdraw Russia from the French also failed. In the summer of 1905, Emperor William II and Tsar Nicholas II met in the Gulf of Finland. The tsar, very zizi, found a courted cousin who proposed a complete overhaul of Russian-German relations. The Treaty of Bjork, which Nicolas gladly signed, would dispossess the alliance with France. But when the tsar returned to St. Petersburg, his officials convinced him that the new agreement would ruin the French alliance and deprive them of the French capital they desperately needed. The servile tsar informed Berlin and turned to political chaos in Russia.
A second factor also helped Russia: Turkish power in Macedonia and the Balkans seemed weaker than ever. The soft eyes were now turning to possible gains on the road and perhaps elsewhere. A third factor also gave Izvolsky confidence: London`s decision to negotiate Persia with Russia and the implicit protection of the British position in India.